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Abstract 
In the early years of powered flight, the National Advisory 
Committee on Aeronautics in the United States produced 
three reports describing a “method of analysis of aircraft 
accidents.”   The first report was published in 1928; the 
second, which was a revision of the first, was published in 
1930; and the third, which was a revision and update of the 
second, was published in 1936. This paper describes the 
contents of these reports, and compares the method of 
analysis proposed therein to the methods used today. 
1 Introduction 
In early 1928, the Assistant Secretaries for Aeronautics in the 
Departments of War, Navy, and Commerce in the United 
States, asked the National Advisory Committee for 
Aeronautics (written as N. A. C. A. at the time, but as NACA 
here) to develop a common approach for the analysis and 
reporting of aircraft accidents within the country.   In 
response to this request, the NACA organized the Special 
Committee on the Nomenclature, Subdivision, and 
Classification of Aircraft Accidents.  This brought together 
representatives of the NACA, the Army Air Corps, the 
Bureau of Aeronautics of the Navy, and the Aeronautics 
Branch of the Department of Commerce.   
 
The NACA committee met sixteen times from March to July 
1928, and issued a report in August 1928 [5].   Subsequent to 
the issuing of the initial report, the NACA. established a 
standing committee, which published updated reports on the 
subject in January 1930 [6] and June 1936 [7].  The remainder 
of this paper presents an overview of the contents of these 
reports and compares the methods proposed to the methods 
used today. 
2 Overview of the NACA Reports 
This section presents an overview of the content of the three 
reports.  Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations are taken 
from the relevant NACA report.  The first report is described 
in the most detail, with the discussion of the other two reports 
concentrating solely on their differences from the 1928 report. 
2.1 1928 Report 
The first NACA report was “undertaken in recognition of the 
difficulty of drawing correct conclusions from efforts to 
analyze and compare reports of aircraft accidents prepared by 
different organizations using different classifications and 
definitions.”  The special committee that developed the 
method of analysis described in the report had as its purpose 
“to prepare a basis for the classification and comparison of 
aircraft accidents, both civil and military.” Towards fulfilling 
this purpose, the committee developed a 14 page report, 
consisting of six main sections, the contents of which are 
described below. 
2.1.1 Introduction 
The Introduction describes the history of the development of 
the report, noting that the proposed method of accident 
analysis was presented to representatives of four foreign 
governments (Britain, France, Italy, and Japan).  At this 
meeting, “great interest was expressed” and the foreign 
representatives were invited to submit comments and 
suggested changes, “but none had been received up to the 
date of the last meeting of the committee.”  
2.1.2 General Considerations 
The second section of the report has five sub-sections: 
Definition of an Aircraft Accident, Immediate Causes, Cross-
Analysis, Aircraft-Accident Analysis Form, and Weighting of 
Accidents. 
 
An aircraft accident is defined as follows: “An aircraft 
accident is an occurrence which takes place while an aircraft 
is being operated as such and as a result of which a person or 
persons are injured or killed, or the aircraft receives 
appreciable or marked damage through the forces of external 
contact or through fire.”  The report notes that “a collision of 
two or more aircraft should be analyzed and reported 
statistically as one accident.”  Note that this definition is not 
substantially different in effect from the definition currently 
in use in civil aviation world-wide, but it is much simpler   
 
The ICAO define an accident to be “An occurrence associated 
with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between the 
time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight 
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until such time as all such persons have disembarked, in which: 
a) a person is fatally or seriously injured as a result of: — being 
in the aircraft, or — direct contact with any part of the aircraft, 
including parts which have become detached from the aircraft, or 
— direct exposure to jet blast, except when the injuries are from 
natural causes, self-inflicted or inflicted by other persons, or 
when the injuries are to stowaways hiding outside the areas 
normally available to the passengers and crew; or b) the aircraft 
sustains damage or structural failure which: — adversely affects 
the structural strength, performance or flight characteristics of 
the aircraft, and—would normally require major repair or 
replacement of the affected component, except for engine failure 
or damage, when the damage is limited to the engine, its 
cowlings or accessories; or for damage limited to propellers, 
wing tips, antennas, tires, brakes, fairings, small dents or 
puncture holes in the aircraft skin; or c) the aircraft is missing or 
is completely inaccessible” [4].  The difference in complexity 
between the initial and current definitions arguably illustrates 
the increasing diversity of modern aviation operations. 
 
In the Immediate Causes sub-section, the process is briefly 
described by which the committee settled on a particular 
analysis method, after considering a variety of possible 
methods.  According to the report the plan developed 
“permits of the analysis of a given accident into two or more 
distinct causes and makes possible, by the use of percentages, 
the indication of the relative weight of each cause in any 
particular accident.”  Interestingly, the report does not give a 
definition for immediate cause, but rather seems to assume 
the reader will know what is meant by the phrase.  The 
subsequent two reports delete this sub-section entirely, but 
continue to use the phrase without definition.    
 
Most modern investigatory techniques have also moved away 
from the notion that it is possible to accurately quantify the 
weight or importance of particular causal factors.   
Organisations such as the NTSB and Canadian TSB will 
distinguish between causes and contributory factors but 
percentages are not used.   There is a recognition that it may 
not be possible to derive an objective priority over the role 
played by, for instance human error or managerial failure 
compared to problems in system engineering.  Such decisions 
are, typically, deferred to the litigation that often follows 
major accidents where courts will decide the liability to be 
associated with key actors in the events leading to an adverse 
event.   It is unfortunate that some of the judgements handed 
down by legal agencies are not well grounded in the 
engineering issues that led to the accident.  
 
The Cross Analysis sub-section explains that the developed 
analysis method “provides for the analysis of crashes 
according to the nature of the accident (take-off accidents, tail 
spins following engine failure, etc.), the degree of seriousness 
of personnel injuries, and the amount of damage to material.”  
Also, the method provides for “analyzing pilot errors and 
material failures according to the underlying causes of these 
errors or failures.”  The sub-section concludes by noting that 
“it is the belief of the committee that if all aircraft accidents 
occurring in all agencies are classified in the manner 
recommended a composite of all the accidents will offer a 
basis upon which a study may be made and correct 
conclusions drawn.”   To date, only partial progress has been 
made towards this goal of the NACA first report.  Accident 
investigation agencies around the world continue to use a vast 
array of non-standardised techniques.  Most aircraft operators 
now have classification schemes for incidents and accidents; 
however, there are few general agreements about the 
ontologies to be used and there is little or no exchange of 
data, in spite of initiatives such as the GAIN program. 
 
The Aircraft Accident Analysis Form sub-section, presents 
and explains a form to be used in analysing accidents.  This 
form is shown in figure 1. The left-hand side lists four broad 
categories of possible immediate causes for an accident: 
personnel, material, miscellaneous, and underdetermined and 
doubtful.  The first three of these are further divided into 
additional categories, with the first two having a third 
subdivision.  Concerning the broad categories, the report 
notes “that the division of immediate causes between 
personnel and material as set forth in the chart and definitions 
was more or less arbitrary, since all defects of aircraft can be 
in the last analysis be attributed to errors of personnel, 
whether in operation, inspection, maintenance, manufacture, 
or design.”  In the opinion of the committee its purposes were 
best served by drawing a line at the “operating personnel of 
the aircraft.”  That is, the Personnel category includes only 
those people directly operating the aircraft.  “Errors due to 
personnel other than those immediately accessory to the 
operation of the aircraft are shown in the ‘Underlying causes’ 
or ‘cross analysis’ … rather than in the main headings of 
immediate causes.” 
 
These underlying causes are enumerated along the top of the 
form, with two main divisions: errors of pilot and material 
failures, along with a column for indeterminate.  Both main 
divisions are further sub-divided to three levels in some cases 
and two in others.  The final sub-section discusses how the 
form may be used to assign a weighting to various causes of a 
particular accident.  This weighting process is described 
below in section 2.1.5 when a typical accident is described. 
2.1.3 Classification of Accidents 
This section of the report presents a three-way classification 
scheme to aid the study of accidents.  The three elements of 
this classification are the nature of the accident, injury to 
personnel, and damage to material.  Before describing each of 
these, the report presents a rationale for the importance of 
appropriate classification schemes. 
 
To explain the rationale, the report notes that “studies of 
accident causes point out needed remedies more clearly when 
they are supplemented by certain studies based upon the 
nature and results of accident.”  An example is then given 
concerning accidents involving tail spins, where it is noted 
that if accidents are “classified according to their nature and 
results, it is noted that the tail spin is the kind of accident that 
is by far the most prevalent among those which produce fatal 
consequences.  It is apparent that new designs which decrease 
the tendency of airplanes to spin, or new training methods 
which increase the ability of pilots to avoid falling into spins 
and to recover from them quickly, will have a marked 
influence toward the prevention of fatal accidents.”    
 
 
 
Figure 1: 1928 NACA Aircraft Accident Analysis Form 
 
Clearly concerns have moved on in the years since the 
publication of this report; however, similar techniques are still 
being used.  For example, the Flight Safety Foundation has 
been instrumental in persuading several investigatory 
agencies to look more closely at issues such as Controlled 
Flight into Terrain.  The European Working on Runway 
Incursions continues this tradition of conducting detailed 
investigations of key safety problems based on the analysis of 
several previous accidents. 
 
For the nature of an accident, the report presents 13 different 
possibilities.  Class A involves collisions in full flight with 
other aircraft, while Class B involves collisions in full flight 
with objects other than aircraft.  Class C (D) includes fail 
spins following engine failure (without engine failure).  Class 
E encompasses forced landings, while Class F includes 
landing accidents where the landing was not forced.  Classes 
G and H are for take-off accidents and taxiing (spelled 
taxying in the report) accidents respectively.  Fires in the air 
are classified as Class I.  Class J includes carrier, platform, 
and arresting-gear accidents; while launching gear accidents 
are called Class K.  Classes L and M include miscellaneous 
and indeterminate/doubtful respectively.    
 
The injury to personnel category has only four possibilities.  
An accident that results in death of an individual within 90 
days is Class A.  Class B includes accidents resulting in a 
serious injury to an individual, while Class C accidents result 
in only a minor injury, and Class D accidents result in no 
injury.  Concerning the classification of injuries, the report 
suggestions that “the opinion of a physician should be 
obtained whenever possible as to whether an injury is severe 
or minor.”  In the absence of a physician, the report provides 
general rules.  Unconsciousness, fracture to any bones other 
than fingers or toes, lacerated muscles, severe hemorrhage, 
injury to internal organs, and incapacitation for more than five 
days are considered severe; all other injuries are minor.    
 
As in previous sections of the NACA report, these 
distinctions are similar to those that guide modern accident 
investigation.  For example, 49 CFR Part 830 guides the 
investigation of accidents by the NTSB: it defines fatal injury 
as any injury which results in death within 30 days of the 
accident.  In contrast, serious injury means any injury which: 
(1) Requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours, 
commencing within 7 days from the date of the injury was 
received; (2) results in a fracture of any bone (except simple 
fractures of fingers, toes, or nose); (3) causes severe 
hemorrhages, nerve, muscle, or tendon damage; (4) involves 
any internal organ; or (5) involves second- or third-degree 
burns, or any burns affecting more than 5 percent of the body 
surface.  As with the previous ICAO definitions of an 
accident, the intent is largely the same as that of the NACA 
definition, but the specific provisions add levels of detail that 
arguably not only reflect the complexity of modern aviation 
operations but which also reflect almost a century of aviation 
litigation. 
 
Damage to materiel has six possibilities.  Class A accidents 
include those in which “the aircraft is of no further value 
except for salvage of usable parts.”  Class B includes 
accidents “as a result of which it is necessary to completely 
overhaul the aircraft before it would be again airworthy.”  
Accidents in which some major component must be replaced 
fall into Class C.  Class D accidents are those in which there 
is only minor damage to the aircraft, while class E are those 
in which there is no damage.  Class F is a special category 
consisting of materiel failures that did not result in an 
accident.   
 
In contrast, the CFR that guides today’s NTSB investigations 
focuses on ‘substantial damage’ which is defined to include 
damage or failure which adversely affects the structural 
strength, performance, or flight characteristics of the aircraft, 
and which would normally require major repair or 
replacement of the affected component. The CFR also notes 
that engine failure or damage limited to an engine if only one 
engine fails or is damaged, bent fairings or cowling, dented 
skin, small punctured holes in the skin or fabric, ground 
damage to rotor or propeller blades, and damage to landing 
gear, wheels, tires, flaps, engine accessories, brakes, or 
wingtips are not considered “substantial damage''.  It can be 
argued that these exemptions illustrate the resource pressures 
that increasingly affect investigatory agencies given the 
substantial rise in aviation traffic since the NACA report was 
published. 
2.1.4 Causes of Accidents 
The report proposes a standard list of possible causes, both 
immediate and underlying, which can be seen on the accident 
analysis form shown previously in figure 1.  Rather than 
describing all of the various causes discussed, we present only 
representative examples. 
 
As an example of an immediate cause, consider the 
carelessness or negligence subdivision of the errors of pilot 
division of the personnel category.  The report describes this 
category as including “all accidents resulting from the 
absence of care on the part of the pilot according to 
circumstances or the failure to use that degree of care which 
the circumstances justly demand, either on the ground, or in 
the air, such as careless manipulation of the controls of an 
aircraft, failure to ascertain the amount of gasoline on board 
before taking off, failure to ascertain the conditions of the 
instruments, etc.”   These distinctions remain applicable 
within the modern aviation environment.   In the United 
States, for instance, there is no special law of aviation 
negligence; the same provisions apply as they do in any other 
spheres of activity.   Pilots must, however, exercise a greater 
standard of care because of the potential harm that could be 
caused by any mishap. 
 
As an example of an underlying cause, consider the 
deteriorated materials subdivision of the faulty materials 
division of the materiel failures category.  This causal 
category “includes all accidents traceable to faulty materials 
where the defects of such materials occurred through 
deterioration after delivery.”   The importance of this category 
of causal factors cannot be underestimated in modern 
aviation.   Composite materials are being introduced into 
areas that were conventionally only fabricated using metal, 
for example in the A380 and the B-787.  These composite 
structures may well create particular challenges for accident 
investigators, as illustrated by the recent NTSB investigation 
into the possible failure of components in the composite 
vertical stabilizer involved in American Airlines flight 587, 
which eventually showed that there was no such failure. 
2.1.5 Description and Typical Analysis of an Accident 
To illustrate the application of the proposed analysis method, 
the NACA report introduces an example.  Figure 2, which is 
taken from the report, provides an overview. The explanation 
of the accident in the report is as follows: 
 
Pilot John Doe was flying a seaplane at 200 feet altitude over 
a point of land between a bay and the open sea when the 
engine stopped.  Pilot Doe had an opportunity to land either 
directly into the wind in the open sea or cross wind in the bay.  
He started to land in the ocean, but at 100 feet altitude he 
changed his mind and attempted to turn so as to land in the 
bay.   In turning, Doe held the nose of the seaplane up, stalled 
it, and spun into the land.  The seaplane was demolished, the 
pilot was seriously injured, and the passenger was killed. 
 
Doe, according to his record, was an experienced aviator 
with 30 hours flying during the preceding month and with 
recent experience in stunting seaplanes.  
 
Examination of the engine showed that one of the teeth in the 
magneto timing gear had stripped, the broken tooth having 
been drawn into the other teeth, causing the eventual 
stripping of all teeth.  The original break was determined to 
be a visible hardening crack. 
 
Figure 2: NACA Example Accident Scenario 
 
Following the method of the report, the analysis of this 
accident begins by classifying it by nature, results to 
personnel, and results to materiel.   The nature of the accident 
is Class C: tail spin following engine failure.  The results to 
personnel are Class BA (that is, one major injury and one 
fatality).    Finally, the destruction of the seaplane means that 
the results to materiel classification is A. 
 
Figure 3 shows the results given in the report for the analysis 
of the causes of this hypothetical accident.  Only the relevant 
upper part of the full form is shown here. 
 
For the immediate causes, the report justifies allocating 75% 
to personnel and 25% to materiel by stating “that the account 
of the accident shows that the pilot had two chances to make a 
safe landing and took advantage of neither of them”  For the 
materiel immediate cause, the further allocations are 
explained as follows: “the entire 25 per cent obviously should 
be assigned to ‘power-plant failure,’ in the second order of 
subdivision, and again in the third order of subdivision the 
entire 25 per cent should be charged to ‘ignition system.’ 
 
For the personnel immediate causes, the report reasons “it is 
obvious that this is chargeable neither to ‘errors of 
supervisory personnel’ nor to ‘errors of other personnel,’” so 
the entire 75% goes to ‘errors of pilot.’  To explain the 35/40 
allocation, the report explains: “It appears further that the 
errors of the pilot involved errors of judgment in that he lost 
altitude while wavering indecisively between landing in the 
ocean and attempting to land in the bay.  It appears that poor 
technique was the most important single factor in that he 
continued to pull the nose up, still further stalling the 
seaplane, when he should have sensed the approaching stall.  
It is considered that a charge of 35 per cent to ‘error of 
judgment’ and 40 per cent to ‘poor technique’ represents as 
near an approximation as can be arrived at in the this case.” 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Completed form for hypothetical accident 
 
The analysis of the underlying causes for the pilot’s errors 
states “that it would appear that the ‘error of judgment’ and 
‘poor technique’ were both due to a ‘temporary poor 
reaction’, citing the absence of any stated history of the 
individual upon which to conclude that the poor reaction was 
inherent.  For the materiel failure, “the underlying cause of 
this materiel failure is unquestionably faulty manufacturing 
and accordingly on the cross analysis it would be placed 
under the head of ‘manufacturing inspection.’ 
 
In spite of the similarities noted in previous sections, there are 
many differences between modern investigatory practices and 
the techniques illustrated in this case study.  In particular, 
human factors experts and psychologists are now well 
integrated into the teams that analyze the causes of aviation 
accidents.  Rather than simply identifying ‘errors in 
judgement’ and ‘poor technique’, today’s reports often spend 
many pages identifying the cognitive and perceptual factors 
that contribute to such adverse events.  Hence, the simple 
interpretation of these early NACA forms has led to more 
sustained multi-disciplinary investigations that are rooted 
deeper in the social sciences than might be apparent from the 
early investigations. 
2.1.6 Conclusion and Recommendations 
The final section of the report made three primary 
recommendations.  One, that the method of accident analysis 
proposed in the report be adopted for use in the War, Navy, 
and Commerce departments.  Two, that copies of the report 
be sent to appropriate representatives of interested foreign 
governments.  And, three, that the personnel of the special 
committee “be reorganized into a standing committee on 
aircraft accidents on the National Advisory Committee for 
Aeronautics for the purpose of considering from time to time 
such new matter regarding aircraft accidents as may appear 
desirable or as may be brought before it.”  All three of these 
recommendations were adopted. 
 
Today there are strong differences in the investigatory 
processes operated in the civil and military sectors of most 
countries, although there are frequent contacts between the 
individuals concerned.   Such informal exchanges are 
critically important given that technical, engineering 
innovations often propagate from military to civil aircraft 
while operational and organisation techniques tend to  flow in 
the opposite direction.   However, the close integration of 
techniques envisaged by NACA has long since ceased to be 
the norm.   
2.2 1930 Report 
The Committee on Aircraft Accidents, which was established 
by the NACA in response to the recommendation of the 1928 
report, produced a revision and extension of that report in 
1930.  The revisions to the report were minor, involving 
changes to definitions and explanatory material, an expanded 
discussion of the example accident, the introduction of a new 
class N (Structural Failure) to the nature of accidents, and the 
re-lettering of classes L and M to X and Y respectively.   The 
accident analysis form was unchanged.  The extensions to the 
report consisted of a response to a particular criticism of the 
method, and a description of the results obtained from 
applying the method.   
2.2.1 Response to Criticism 
A major criticism of the 1928 report was that the weighting 
process was likely subject to considerable individual 
variation.   The response given to this criticism was to discuss 
a test conducted by the original special committee, but not 
mentioned in the first report.  Each member of that committee 
was given 6 identical accident reports, which each person 
analyzed independently.  The results were then averaged and 
compared with the individual weightings.  “Every member 
was willing to accept the average values as a fair analysis of 
the various accidents and the differences between the values 
assigned by the individuals and the averages were remarkably 
small.” 
 
Today, similar trials have been conducted into the impact of 
subjectivity in the application of accident investigation 
techniques.  For instance, Johnson and Holloway compares 
the different insights derived by the use of the STAMP 
approach by two different investigators on a single accident 
[2].  Holloway and Johnson analyse the role of subjectivity 
across several hundred investigations [1].   It is ironic to find 
that the criticisms of the original NACA report raise concerns 
that continue to be the topic of workshops and research papers 
even today. 
2.2.2 Results from Use of the Method 
The second extension was a description of the results that had 
been obtained in application of the method for a little over a 
year by the Army, Navy, and Department of Commerce.  The 
accidents analyzed all occurred before January 1929, and 
extended back in time for several years.  There were 1432 
military accidents and 1400 civil accidents that were 
analyzed.  The report presents two tables, one of which shows 
the percentages of accidents in each of the 14 ‘nature of 
accident’ categories, and the other of which shows 
percentages according to immediate causes.   For the 
immediate causes, slightly less than 50% of the military and 
civil accidents were attributed to pilot error, a result which 
corresponds fairly well to recent studies of major civil 
aviation accidents in the United States [1, 3].   
2.3 1936 Report 
In 1936, the Committee on Aircraft Accidents produced 
another report, based on the occurrence of some accidents 
“for which the specified classifications seemed inadequate.”  
The major changes included subdivision of some the classes 
describing the nature of an accident, elimination of class F in 
the damage to material classification (note also the change in 
spelling from materiel to material), and modification of and 
addition to the categories for immediate causes.  These 
modifications resulted in corresponding changes to the 
analysis form. 
 
The 1936 report does not include the results presented in the 
1930 report, but it does include the response to the early 
criticism.  It also notes the existence of a procedure for 
providing guidance on interpretation of the definitions and 
use of the methods, saying “these questions have generally 
been referred to the committee for opinions or the 
interpretations followed have been communicated for 
approval.  In this manner there has been established a sort of  
approved procedure.” 
 
The need to update and maintain an accident classification 
taxonomy between the 1928, 1930, and 1936 reports 
illustrates a problem that continues for modern investigatory 
agencies and commercial aviation organisations.   Changes in 
technology, in organisational and operation practice can force 
continual changes in the categories that are used to codify 
accident data.  As mentioned previously, the increasingly 
multi-disciplinary nature of many investigations also 
introduces new concepts, not just in the area of human error 
analysis but also in causal modelling.   Recent work has been 
conducted into the use of computational techniques to 
minimise the overheads that arise when new classifications 
force the re-codification of previous accidents; however, this 
novel generation of accident search and retrieval tools is not 
yet widely used in many investigatory agencies. 
3 Concluding Remarks 
The NACA led a pioneering initiative to establish common 
approaches to the investigation and analysis of aviation 
accidents.  Their reports in 1928, 1930 and 1936 laid the 
seeds that in 1967 led to the establishment of the US National 
Transportation Safety Board.   By studying these early 
attempts to establish common methods of investigation, we 
can see the generic nature of many of the issues that continue 
to complicate accident investigations.   For example, there is a 
common concern to develop objective analytical techniques 
that enable lessons to be shared between different 
investigators across a number of different organisations.  
There is also a common concern to identify multiple causes 
that consider both engineering and human factors issues.  A 
common misconception today is that considering such issues 
is a relatively recent innovation.  Our study of these early 
investigatory procedures shows this is not the case, as the 
reports illustrate a degree of sophistication in the analysis of 
pilot interaction.    
 
There are, however, some important differences between the 
NACA reports and current investigatory practices.   In 
particular, the committees’ desire to develop common 
techniques between civilian and military reporting systems is 
very far from being achieved in the US or Europe.   This 
creates problems when engineering innovations are often 
transferred from military to civil systems.   Similarly, the 
NACA focus on establishing the weighting of causal factors 
has largely been abandoned, although it persists in civil 
litigation where the courts may assign civil liability to 
individuals and organisations in proportion to their 
involvement in an accident. 
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